Four hours of administration a month for ten years of bin management: Kalmthout was entitled to reject SITA’s price justification that mainly pointed to its subcontractors
The municipality of Kalmthout excluded SITA Recycling Services’ offer for a ten-year management and registration system for household waste bins (estimate 1,008,530 euros) because its price justification mainly referred to the rates of subcontractor D&C and supplier OTTO and its only worked example provided for just four hours of administration and eight hours of inspection per month; the Council of State found that assessment reasonable, accepted the estimate and a self-chosen 25% threshold as a working tool, and dismissed the extreme-urgency application.
What happened?
In May 2010 the municipality of Kalmthout launched, by open call for tenders, a services contract for the ‘reintroduction and maintenance of an adapted management and registration system for household waste bins’ across its whole territory, for ten years and estimated at 1,008,530 euros excluding VAT. The contract had four items: awareness-raising including a written survey of the entire population, an adjustment phase in which bins are placed or exchanged, an aftercare phase covering full management and registration of collection frequencies and weights, and the supply of bins, parts and chips. Price weighed 400 points, aftercare and the registration system 200 each, awareness-raising and technical quality 100 each. Two offers were received: from NV SITA Recycling Services and from NV Plastic Omnium, the incumbent contractor. At selection the municipality noted that at SITA a subcontractor would perform items 1 to 3, about 86% of the contract, whereas the specifications asked bidders to limit the use of subcontractors; both bidders were nevertheless selected. Because in both offers many unit prices deviated by more than 25% from the estimate, and at SITA the total price as well, the municipality asked both by registered letter of 16 August 2010 to justify their prices. Plastic Omnium answered on 18 August, SITA on 25 August. For the low prices of items 1 and 3, SITA referred to the calculation of subcontractor D&C: an SME with some 80 staff, its own software, about 25 projects a year and never a complaint. It gave one worked example for aftercare (37,922 euros a year) and mentioned a profit margin of about 15%. For the bins it referred to a framework agreement between the SITA group and supplier OTTO and to an extra commercial effort by OTTO, which wanted to become a reference in the IGEAN region. The municipality did not accept this. The points about D&C did not distinguish that subcontractor from the other bidder enough to make the prices acceptable; there was no transparent price build-up; the worked example provided for only four hours of administration and eight hours of inspection a month, whereas the specifications placed full management of the bins with the service provider; and most references concerned different services. Those items represented 86% of the offer price. The reference to OTTO contained no objective elements or price structure, for items accounting for 13.5% of the offer. The municipality did accept the high price for item 2, because SITA gave an objective explanation there (fixed costs spread over a limited quantity of 1,500 connection points) and Plastic Omnium’s price was also well above the estimate. The abnormal prices at Plastic Omnium concerned unused variants or items of very low value. On 13 September 2010 the municipal executive endorsed the evaluation report, excluded SITA’s offer as irregular and awarded the contract to Plastic Omnium. SITA received the decision on 14 September, with a partly redacted report, and on 28 September 2010 sought suspension under extreme urgency. Because the contract had been published after 24 February 2010, the new remedies act of 23 December 2009 already applied: SITA did not need to show serious harm that is difficult to repair, only a serious plea. It raised three, and none convinced. The estimate turned out not to be based merely on the prices of the current contract with Plastic Omnium, but on a market study by the environmental department, the municipality’s own contracts, data from Schoten and Schilde, from the intermunicipal company IDM and from IGEAN. Nor was the offer excluded merely on the basis of that estimate. The 25% threshold was not an absolute limit for abnormality, only a reasonable choice for launching a price investigation. The municipality acceptably explained the difference between a deviation of 40% and one of 53.8% as a recalculation based on the contract term. The formal reasoning was in order, the exclusion rested on the unit prices and not on the total price, and references sufficient for selection need not justify abnormal prices. The transparency principle does not require the estimate to be disclosed in advance, and redacting passages was covered by article 65/10; through the full version filed confidentially, the Council could verify that both bidders had been treated equally. The application was dismissed; SITA bears 175 euros in costs and Plastic Omnium 125 euros for its intervention.
Why does this matter?
This judgment, from the first months after the 2009 remedies act, lays building blocks the Council of State still uses today. Most importantly: a price justification that mainly refers to the rates of subcontractors or suppliers, topped up with a profit margin and a list of the subcontractor’s qualities, is not a justification. The bidder must itself substantiate the subcontractor’s price objectively, or submit a statement in which the subcontractor does so. That weighs all the more heavily where, as here, 86% of the contract is subcontracted. Second: the estimate is in principle an acceptable and objective benchmark, certainly if the authority can show that it rests on several sources and not just on the incumbent’s prices. Third: an authority may choose its own threshold (here 25%) for deciding when to investigate prices, as long as it does not become an automatic abnormality limit. The judgment also shows how a single worked example can backfire: whoever provides four hours of administration a month for ten years of full bin management proves that the price is unrealistic rather than that it adds up. For practice, the lesson on transparency is useful too: the authority need not publish the estimate in advance and may redact commercially sensitive passages, as long as the Council can see the full report.
The lesson
For bidders: justify every suspect price with your own verifiable figures — hours, rates, materials, outputs — not with a description of how good your subcontractor is. If your price relies on a subcontractor or a framework contract with a supplier, have that party substantiate its own price build-up in writing and attach it. Test your worked examples against what the specifications concretely require: an estimate of hours that does not fit the described service is an argument against you. And the larger the subcontracted share of the contract, the deeper you must go into your subcontractor’s figures. For authorities: build your estimate from several documented sources so that it holds up as a benchmark. Use a threshold to trigger price investigations, but then assess each item on its merits. Treat all bidders equally and file the full evaluation report confidentially if you redact passages in the notification.
Ask yourself
As a bidder: does your price justification contain your own figures for each item, or does it mainly refer to the rates and qualities of your subcontractor or supplier? Have you attached a written, substantiated price build-up from your subcontractor or supplier to your justification? Do the hours and resources in your worked examples match the service the specifications concretely describe? As an authority: on which sources does your estimate rest, and can you show that it does not merely reflect the incumbent contractor’s prices? Do you use a price-investigation threshold only as a starting point, and then assess each item on its merits and in the same way for all bidders?
About this database
The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →