Rejection French-speaking chamber

Sodexo promises a 425,000-euro subsidy but enters 455,994 euros: Liège could reject the outgoing caterer’s bid

Ruling nr. 208419 · 25 October 2010 · VIe kamer

The Council of State dismisses Sodexo Belgium’s application against the award of food supplies for the restaurants of the Université de Liège to Compass Group: in its tender form Sodexo exceeded the 430,000-euro subsidy ceiling set in the specifications, and the university could regard its promise to reach 425,000 euros anyway, thanks to catering and a coffee corner, as a ‘bet’ on activities outside the contract — not a relevant justification of the overrun.

What happened?

On the opening of its new restaurant on the Sart Tilman campus, the Université de Liège launched an open call for tenders with EU publicity for the supply of food to its restaurants and cafeterias, on behalf of the non-profit ‘Restaurants’ that runs them. The contract went beyond mere supply: the contractor also had to manage and supervise meal preparation, and through its sale prices to the non-profit committed to a maximum subsidy the university would have to pay each year to cover the non-profit’s deficit. The specifications set that subsidy at a maximum of 430,000 euros (excluding building maintenance and utility costs) and repeated this in several places, including an ‘important remark’ under the financial criterion: a bidder whose calculation exceeds 430,000 euros must justify the overrun, and its bid is substantially void if that justification is not relevant. The financial criterion weighed 50 %, quality of supplies 30 % and quality of organisation 20 %. Free variants were allowed. On 11 August 2010 Sodexo Belgium, Aramark and Compass Group Belgilux submitted bids. The advising professors Daube and Paquot saw the three candidates as close; Daube even put Sodexo ‘a short head’ in front (76 % against 74 % for Compass and 71 % for Aramark), while noting that its bid was heavily penalised by missing HACCP documents, and Paquot preferred it nutritionally. Yet the working group did not compare the bids: Sodexo’s and Aramark’s were found irregular because the calculated subsidy exceeded 430,000 euros. Sodexo’s tender form showed a deficit of 455,994.64 euros in scenario 1 and 431,241.55 euros in scenario 2. In an attached document of some thirty pages, ‘Etapes d’une collaboration’, it wrote that the price schedules did not account for the catering activity (some 400,000 euros a year), a new coffee corner and a ‘bet on overall activity growth’ of some 160,000 euros, and that it could therefore commit to a real subsidy of 425,000 euros. According to Sodexo, catering was part of the contract, and its question on the matter of 7 July 2010 went unanswered; the university maintained that catering fell outside the contract and that this had been said at the information meetings of 22 June and 12 July 2010. Compass met the ceiling (with a subsidy of 414,093 euros) by raising the prices of category 2 products by 15 to 20 %. On 29 September 2010 the executive board awarded the contract to Compass as the only regular bidder. Sodexo sought suspension under extreme urgency on 14 October 2010. The Council first held that the 430,000-euro ceiling was prima facie decisive for the application of the financial criterion, and that permitted variants could not lead to it being exceeded. Sodexo had exceeded the ceiling; if the price schedule did not allow it to refine its price, it had to give a relevant justification for the overrun. Because its estimate rested on what it itself called a ‘bet’, linked to a coffee corner and further development of activities including catering — a service that ‘does appear to be excluded’ from the contract — the university could, without manifest error, find the projection uncertain and the overrun not relevantly justified. The second complaint, that Compass’s bid undermined the social purpose of the contract through higher prices for students and an alleged 7 % staff reduction at the non-profit, concerned not the regularity but the expediency of that bid, on which the Council does not rule. Moreover, Sodexo relied on a risk, not on certain consequences, and the staff costs in both bids (1,128,855.73 euros for Sodexo, 1,060,000 euros for Compass) were lower than the 1,157,474.04 euros of 2009. The acting president of the VIth chamber dismissed the application and ordered Sodexo to pay the costs of 175 euros.

Why does this matter?

This 2010 judgment shows sharply what a financial ceiling in the specifications means when the authority expressly attaches the sanction of substantial nullity to it. Sodexo came out narrowly on top in the expert opinions and knew the activity — by its own account it had been the university’s contractor since 2003 and had seen the subsidy fall from 1,071,363 euros in 2001-2002 to 620,000 euros in 2010. Yet that did not count: what the Council set against the ceiling were the figures in the tender form, and they were above it. An accompanying note promising a lower amount does not make the bid regular when that promise rests on activities the authority keeps outside the contract. The judgment also teaches that ‘free variants’ are no back door to circumvent a hard condition: a variant may not break the ceiling. At the same time, the Council draws a clear line in the other direction. Whoever challenges the regularity of a competitor’s bid must show that it breaches a requirement of the specifications; the fact that the competitor meets the ceiling through price rises unfavourable to students is a choice the authority may accept on expediency grounds. The social purpose of a contract only becomes a regularity requirement when the specifications translate it into a concrete, verifiable obligation.

The lesson

Bidders: if the specifications impose a ceiling on pain of nullity, make sure the figures you enter in the mandatory form stay below it. If the form cannot reflect your business model, ask questions in time, and if the answer is missing or goes against you, build your bid within the framework the authority has drawn — not on activities it says fall outside the contract. A justification of an overrun must explain why the ceiling is unattainable within the contract, not promise that extra activities will make it work. Experience as the outgoing contractor is no proof here. And whoever attacks a competitor’s bid must point to a concrete breach of the specifications, not an unfavourable policy choice. Contracting authorities: a ceiling repeated in several places in the specifications and expressly tied to a sanction will hold. Also state clearly what does and does not belong to the contract — and answer questions on that in writing, since the dispute over catering played a key role here.

Ask yourself

Do the amounts in your tender form itself stay within every ceiling set by the specifications, regardless of what you promise in accompanying notes? If you justify an overrun: do you explain why the ceiling is unattainable within the contract, or do you rely on activities that (may) fall outside it? Have you raised uncertainties about the scope of the contract in writing, and recorded the answer? Are you using a variant to get around a hard condition of the specifications, when variants may not breach that condition? When challenging a competitor’s bid: do you point to a concrete breach of the specifications, or to a choice the authority could accept on expediency grounds? As an authority: do you expressly attach a sanction to an essential financial ceiling, and define the scope of the contract clearly?

About this database

The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →