Rejection Dutch-speaking chamber

Is the Professional Institute of Real Estate Agents a contracting authority? Whoever wants that accepted under extreme urgency must prove it in the application

Ruling nr. 267113 · 19 June 2026 · XIVe kamer

BV T., ranked second with 78.5 points against 86.8 for the non-profits V. and C., sought suspension under extreme urgency of the award of the BIV’s trainee-training contract, but the Council of State held that it had not shown, prima facie, that the BIV is a contracting authority — the minister’s after-the-fact supervision does not amount to dominant public influence — so the presumption of urgency in the remedies act did not apply and the application, which said nothing else about urgency, failed.

What happened?

The Professional Institute of Real Estate Agents (BIV) published on its website a ‘request for offers’ for the appointment of a partner to further develop the training of BIV trainees. Each year 750 to 850 new trainees join, with on average some 2,200 on the list. The contract covered three mandatory webinars-on-demand of at least two hours (ethics, anti-discrimination and anti-money-laundering) and a catalogue of at least thirty additional courses from which trainees can freely choose up to twelve hours. As its legal framework, the document, approved by the National Council on 4 March 2026, referred not to public procurement law but to article 43 of the Royal Decree of 20 July 2012 on the BIV’s organisation and functioning. The BIV wished to ‘collect several cost estimates’, reserved the right to negotiate with bidders of its choice, and used five criteria: price (30), guarantee of performance (30), keeping the offer up to date (20), language guarantee (10) and experience (10). Eight offers were received; two were found irregular or incomplete. The joint offer of the non-profits V. and C. scored 86.8 points, that of BV T. 78.5. On 22 April 2026 the National Council approved the award to the two non-profits; BV T. learned on 5 May 2026 that it had not won and received the evaluation report on 7 May. On 22 May 2026 it sought suspension under extreme urgency. The BIV argued that the application was inadmissible because it is not a contracting authority. The Council dismissed that objection: the classification does not affect admissibility, but it does determine which suspension conditions apply. And that is where BV T.’s case faltered. It relied on article 15 of the Act of 17 June 2013, which requires no proof of urgency — a provision which, via article 31, also applies below the European thresholds, so the non-profits’ argument about the 750,000-euro threshold for social and other specific services failed. But article 15 presupposes a decision by a contracting authority. The BIV did not dispute that it was set up to meet needs in the general interest not having an industrial or commercial character and that it has legal personality, but it did dispute dominant public influence. BV T. relied only on the minister’s supervision via a government commissioner. According to the BIV, that supervision under article 8, § 4, of the Framework Act of 3 August 2007 goes no further than an after-the-fact review of legality, competence, solvency and budget, which under Court of Justice case law (Ärztekammer Westfalen-Lippe, FIGC) is not enough. The BIV also pointed to a legal opinion of the FPS Economy. The Council held that BV T.’s application did not explain why that supervision went beyond after-the-fact review and did not even discuss that case law; its general reference to financial and budgetary control cited no regulatory basis. The statutory provisions it listed only at the hearing were disregarded: they could have been in the application and thereby escaped examination by the auditor. Nor was the fact that the BIV may previously have awarded a similar contract under public procurement law sufficient. The ordinary conditions of article 17 of the coordinated laws therefore applied — and the application said nothing about extreme urgency beyond a reference to the article 15 presumption. The intervening parties also pointed out that the contract would only start in about six months. The Council dismissed the application and ordered BV T. to pay the costs: 200 euros in roll fees, a 26-euro contribution and a 770-euro procedural indemnity to the BIV. The non-profits each bear half of the 300-euro intervention fee.

Why does this matter?

The judgment touches on a question reaching beyond real estate agents: are professional bodies and institutes — with legal personality, a statutory mission in the general interest and a government commissioner at the table — contracting authorities? The Council does not decide that question on the merits. It merely finds that it is ‘not easy to answer’, that it requires a concrete analysis of financing, supervision and the composition of the governing bodies, and that whoever raises it in extreme-urgency proceedings must set out the relevant grounds clearly in the application. That the BIV is not on the non-exhaustive list in annex 1 to the Royal Decree of 18 April 2017 decides nothing, according to the Council; but the European test of ‘active control over management’ and the rule that after-the-fact supervision is in principle insufficient make it a steep climb for the applicant. The procedural lesson matters just as much. BV T. built its entire case on urgency on the presumption of article 15 of the Act of 17 June 2013. When that presumption fell away, the application contained not a word on why the matter could not wait. Anyone unsure whether procurement law applies must therefore also substantiate ordinary urgency, and must not save their strongest arguments for the hearing: the Council will then refuse to examine them.

The lesson

For bidders: if an organisation on the edge of the public sector — a professional body, an institute, a non-profit with public ties — issues a ‘request for offers’ outside procurement law and you want to go to extreme urgency, explain concretely in your application why it is a contracting authority: which provisions govern its financing, supervision and the appointment of its directors, and why that supervision is more than after-the-fact review. Discuss the Court of Justice case law explicitly. And, in case the presumption of urgency does not apply, also substantiate with precise, verifiable facts why you cannot await the ordinary procedure. Arguments raised only at the hearing do not count. For such organisations themselves: this judgment is not a free pass. The Council expressly left the question open and dismissed the application on a prima facie basis, partly in light of a legal opinion of the FPS Economy. Anyone placing themselves outside procurement law would do well to be able to justify that choice solidly and with documentation.

Ask yourself

As a bidder: do you know whether the organisation issuing the contract is legally a contracting authority, and can you support that with the rules on its financing, supervision and board composition? Does your extreme-urgency application rest entirely on the presumption of urgency in article 15 of the Act of 17 June 2013, or have you also developed ordinary urgency in case that presumption does not apply? Is your full argument in the application, or are you counting on the hearing to fill the gaps? As a professional body or semi-public institution: have you tested the choice to award outside procurement law against the financing, supervision and governance criteria, and recorded that analysis in writing?

About this database

The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →