Suspension French-speaking chamber

Forty per cent off is not a price: CPAS Tubize makes 40 of 100 points depend on a catalogue discount rate, and the cheapest meat supplier loses

Ruling nr. 267940 · 7 October 2026 · VIe kamer

The CPAS (public social welfare centre) of Tubize awarded the supply of meat and charcuterie for its care home to Meco Group, which won thanks to the second award criterion — a discount rate on the catalogue, worth 40 points — but the Council of State suspended the award because such a criterion only measures the nominal size of a discount, whereas the real economic advantage depends on the prices after discount.

What happened?

On 8 October and 10 December 2025 the CPAS of Tubize decided to launch a joint supply contract by open procedure for food and non-food products for its care home ‘Les Bruyères sur Senne’. Lot 6, ‘fresh meat and fresh charcuterie’, went to Meco Group SA on 11 February 2026. Walravens SA applied on 11 March 2026 for suspension under extreme urgency; the CPAS withdrew the award on 8 April 2026, and by judgment no. 266.490 of 24 April 2026 the Council declared that application inadmissible. On that same 8 April the CPAS decided to re-tender lot 6, jointly with the city of Tubize, under new specifications MP 2026-001. It was a schedule-of-rates contract for 20 months (1 June 2026 to 31 January 2028), then renewable twice for one year until January 2030. The selection criterion was an average annual turnover of at least 90,000 euros over the last three years. There were two award criteria. The first, worth 60 points, assessed the total price of an inventory of the products the kitchen uses most, by a rule of three. The second, worth 40 points, assessed the discount rate the tenderer granted on ‘all products in the catalogue’ outside that inventory, also by a rule of three; the catalogue had to be attached to the tender. According to the CPAS those products were meant for more exceptional purchases, such as themed evenings. On 19 May 2026 the CPAS opened the two tenders, from Meco Group and from Walravens. The inventory prices were 3.88% apart, and Walravens’s tender contained a non-substantial calculation error. For the catalogue criterion, the CPAS examined a sample of about twelve references, chosen ‘in consultation with the head chef’; checking the full catalogues was, according to the evaluation report, materially impossible. On 11 June 2026 the CPAS asked both tenderers for further explanations of their prices, and it concluded that neither tender contained abnormal prices. Meco Group obtained 97.75 points, Walravens 85. On 12 August 2026 the social welfare council awarded the contract to Meco Group. The figures in the judgment show that Walravens obtained the full 60 points on the price criterion and Meco Group 57.75, but that Meco received 15 more points on the discount criterion: the judgment refers to a 40% discount from the competitor against 25% from Walravens. On 1 September 2026 Walravens again applied for suspension under extreme urgency. It argued that the second criterion was not linked to the subject-matter of the contract, and that it made no sense to assess a discount without looking at the base price to which it applies. The first argument failed: the specifications described the subject-matter broadly as the supply of fresh meat and fresh charcuterie, and products outside the inventory could apparently also be ordered. The second argument was serious. According to Councillor of State Florence Piret, sitting alone as acting president, a discount rate measures only ‘the nominal size of a discount’, whereas the real economic advantage depends on the prices after discount. The Council gave five reasons why the catalogue and the sample did not change this. One: the tenderers prima facie committed to a discount rate, not to the catalogue prices themselves, so those prices could rise during performance and the check at award stage seemed ‘entirely futile’. Two: even if all base prices are ‘normal’, a discount does not identify the cheapest tender. Three: twelve products from catalogues of hundreds of references is not a representative sample. Moreover, the selection was not provided for in the procurement documents: if those products matter, why are they not in the inventory, and if they do not, why those twelve? Four: even with honest catalogues one would still have to show that the products are equivalent and that the competitor’s net prices really are lower, before concluding that a 40% discount is worth more than 25%. Five: the criterion threatened to wipe out the real price advantage on the inventory — the products ordered regularly — so that a possibly ancillary part of the cost determined the award. The CPAS admitted in its own decision that the discount was ‘a decisive element’ of the most economically advantageous tender. The Council saw no adverse consequences of a suspension that would outweigh its benefits, and on 7 October 2026 it ordered the suspension of the award decision, with immediate effect, in line with the opinion of first auditor Muriel Vanderhelst. The documents the CPAS had filed confidentially remained confidential; costs were reserved.

Why does this matter?

A discount rate on a catalogue as an award criterion is no rarity in food, office-supply and maintenance contracts. It looks like an easy way to also cover products outside the inventory. This judgment shows why it usually does not work. A discount in itself says nothing about what the authority will ultimately pay: 40% off a high catalogue price can cost more than 25% off a low one. If, in addition, the tenderer commits only to the rate and not to the catalogue prices, it can raise those base prices during performance, and any check at award stage becomes pointless. The Council accepts that the criterion is linked to the subject-matter — the problem lies not there but in relevance: the criterion does not help identify the most economically advantageous tender. The criticism of the weighting is also striking. Forty per cent of the points went to what the CPAS itself called ‘more exceptional’ purchases, while the real price difference on the regularly ordered products favoured the loser. The attempt to rescue the criterion with a sample of twelve products, chosen with the head chef, backfired: what is important enough to check belongs in the inventory. And the judgment shows that withdrawing and re-tendering after a first extreme-urgency application is no guarantee: the second award of this lot was suspended too.

The lesson

For contracting authorities: assess prices, not discounts. If you want to cover products outside the fixed list, include them in the inventory, possibly with a smaller weighting, or assess a representative, predetermined basket of net prices. Do not let tenderers commit only to a discount rate, but also to the catalogue prices or a price-revision formula. Make sure the weighting matches the economic weight of what you will actually order, and provide for any sample in the procurement documents instead of choosing it afterwards. For bidders: if you lose while being cheapest on the inventory, work out where the points come from. A criterion that rewards an abstract quantity — a percentage, a number, a promise without a price — can be manifestly unreasonable, even if it is linked to the subject-matter. And a re-tender after withdrawal deserves as critical a reading as the first specifications.

Ask yourself

As an authority: does each price criterion measure what you will actually pay, or only a percentage or another abstract quantity? Do tenderers also commit to the base prices to which their discount applies? Does the weighting of your criteria reflect the share of those purchases in total spending? Is any sample set out in advance in the procurement documents — and if those products matter, why are they not simply in the inventory? As a bidder: do you know exactly on which criterion you lost points, and can you show that this criterion distorts the comparison of tenders?

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